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Abstract
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incen-
tives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating
agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private informa-
tion and even contradict public information in an attempt to minimize reputational costs.
A monopolistic agency can act conservatively by issuing too many bad ratings when a
project is expected to be good based on private and public information. In a competitive
setting, an agency becomes bolder and can issue too many good ratings when a project is
expected to be bad based on private and public information. The paper provides a reason
for why competition in the ratings industry might lead to overly optimistic ratings even
in the absence of conflicts of interest.
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1 Introduction
The role of rating agencies is to provide information to investors about the ability of firms or
other institutions to timely repay their debt obligations. Reputation is rating agencies’ main
asset, since it confers credibility to their announcements and consequently makes firms hire
their services. The Economist1 summarizes the importance of reputation for rating agencies
as follows:
“Even more than for accountants and lawyers, they [rating agencies] must trade
on their reputations. If bond investors lose faith in the integrity of rating agencies’
judgments, they will no longer pay attention to their ratings; if rating agencies’
opinions cease to affect the price that borrowers pay for capital, companies and
governments will not pay their fees. So market forces should make rating agencies
careful of their good names”
Therefore, one would expect reputational concerns to be a strong motive for rating agencies to
try hard not to make mistakes and to use all available information, both public (e.g. account-
ing statements) and private (e.g. confidential interviews) when reporting their judgments to
investors. Of course these two sources of information need to be balanced if the objective is
to avoid mistakes; an accurate rating should incorporate private information, but issuing a
rating according to public expectations might be the best strategy for a rating agency whose
private information is noisy.2 However, this paper shows that reputational concerns can actu-
ally destroy this balance and generate too little reliance on private information, and in some
circumstances, even on public information.
The aim of the paper is therefore to assess how reliable the information transmitted by
rating agencies that worry about reputation can be taking into account the trade-off between
private and public information, and also to explore in what way the structure of the ratings
industry affects information revelation. It demonstrates that reputational concerns combined
1”Use and Abuse of Reputation”, The Economist, page 20, April 6th, 1996.
2Because private information might be incorrect or difficult to interpret or even because the rating agency
is unsure about the quality of its risk assessment models.
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with poor quality of private information and an environment in which this information is easy
to manipulate generate situations in which rating agencies can be overly pessimistic or overly
optimistic in their ratings depending on how the ratings industry is organized. The results
hold even though the model abstracts from conflicts of interest and repeated relationships
between rating agencies and the firms that hire them, or bribes.
Ratings are widely used to mitigate asymmetric information among market participants
and also for regulatory purposes. For example, the regulatory regime requires or encourages
investors such as broker-dealers, banks, insurance companies or pension funds, to purchase
financial instruments that are rated investment grade, and borrowers’ credit ratings are used
to calculate capital adequacy ratios of banks. For these reasons, it is of foremost importance
to understand how rating agencies behave and which mechanisms can be put into practice to
increase the informational content of ratings.
In the model presented below, there is an entrepreneur at each time period who develops
a project that can be good or bad and that is fully financed by outside investors using debt.
Ratings are mandatory and a rating can be good or bad. Investors demand a good rating to
finance the project. There is one rating agency that has both public and private information
about the type of the project. Public information is the prior belief that the project is good.
Depending on the value of the prior belief a project is defined as expected to be very bad,
bad, good or very good. Private information takes the form of a private signal. This private
signal can be perfect or noisy which means that a rating agency can be of two types: it can
perfectly identify the project’s type or it can make small mistakes. Both investors and the
entrepreneur are unsure about the rating agency’s type but attach a subjective probability
to a rating agency not making mistakes. I refer to this probability as the rating agency’s
reputation. The fee paid by the entrepreneur for rating services will be shown to increase
with reputation.
When a project is expected to very good or very bad (and even bad) based on public
information, a rating agency that makes mistakes often chooses to conform to public infor-
mation going against what its private information indicates because of fears of being wrong.
3
For example, if investors expect the project to be very good (very bad) based on public infor-
mation and the agency’s private information indicates that the project is bad (good), there
are situations in which it chooses to issue a good (bad) rating. I refer to this behavior as
conformism.
However, when a project is expected to be good based on public information there are
situations in which a rating agency that makes mistakes chooses to contradict this information
even when the agency’s private information indicates that the project is good, and issues a
bad rating. I refer to this behavior as conservatism. This happens because the rating agency
wants to minimize reputational costs. A project issued with a good rating is undertaken and
its outcome is verifiable. In this case, a correct rating boosts the rating agency’s reputation
and consequently, the future fee that it can charge; and an incorrect rating reveals the rating
agency’s type and lowers this future fee. A project issued with a bad rating is not undertaken
as such project does not receive funding from outside investors. Its outcome is therefore not
verifiable. This limits the learning process about the rating agency’s type and allows a rating
agency that makes mistakes to keep its reputation (and the future fee) reasonably unscathed.
Sending a bad rating is therefore seen as a safer option for such a rating agency.
Finally, the paper looks at what happens when two rating agencies compete to rate a
project. It will be shown that the rating agency that is hired by the entrepreneur is the
one with the highest reputational level. In a competitive setting a rating agency issues good
ratings more often. In fact, when a project is expected to be bad based on public information
there are situations in which a rating agency that makes mistakes chooses to contradict this
information even when the agency’s private information indicates that the project is bad, and
issues a good rating. I refer to this behavior as boldness. This happens because a rating
agency needs to persuade the entrepreneur and investors that it is of the type that does not
make mistakes or otherwise the entrepreneur might prefer hiring the competitor rating agency.
As in the monopolistic case, a project issued with a good rating allows the rating agency to
boost its reputation and to continue being hired by the entrepreneur if this rating is correct.
If the rating is incorrect, the rating agency’s type is revealed and the entrepreneur prefers
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hiring the competitor. However, a bad rating also entails some risks in a competitive setting.
By not being verifiable a bad rating does not necessarily boost reputation and it can even
be perceived by investors as a likely mistake, in particular when a project is expected to be
good or very good based on public information. The rating agency’s type is not revealed but
its chances of continuing being hired by the entrepreneur can also be damaged. Hence, the
gains for a rating agency from persuading everyone else that it is of the type that does not
make mistakes and keeping the competitor away tend to outweigh the penalization that losing
business inflicts on it if a good rating turns out to be a mistake.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on competition and information revelation for
financial intermediaries by explicitly considering the role of reputation and the role of public
versus private information. Moreover, it is applied to the case of rating agencies which have
different features from other financial intermediaries that have been discussed in the literature,
as for example investment banks or financial analysts.
A recent contribution to this literature is the paper by Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007)
which looks at the conflicts of interest that financial intermediaries face when providing advice
about which financial products are best for their customers, and how sufficient competition
can overcome such conflicts. Also in this literature, Lizzeri (1999) discusses the strategic
manipulation of information by intermediaries who collect information from privately informed
agents and then decide what to disclose to the uninformed ones. Both models abstract from
the role of public versus private information and from how the outcome of an intermediary’s
actions affects its reputation. In Lizzeri’s model an intermediary cannot establish a reputation
and in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro’s model reputation takes the form of a fixed reputational
cost, contrarily to the model developed here which deals with reputation using Bayesian
updating.
Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris (2001) also address the issue of reputation and
information revelation. Both papers build on the papers of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and
Sobel (1985) by developing repeated cheap talk models in which there is a sender of infor-
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mation, which is equivalent to the rating agency in the model presented here, whose type
(honest if he always reports truthfully or strategic if he wants to maximize reputation) is
unknown to receivers. Benabou and Laroque (1992) assume the honest sender always reports
his signal and, because private information is noisy, they conclude that a strategic sender that
wants to look honest can manipulate information without risking losing all his credibility as
predictions which turn out to be incorrect can always be attributed to an honest mistake.
Morris (2001) endogenizes the behavior of the honest sender and shows that this sender can
also have incentives to lie in order to enhance reputation. These papers also do not fully ex-
plore the trade-off between public and private information. Moreover, in the model developed
here a rating agency always acts as a strategic sender that wants to maximize reputation and
therefore profits.
Information revelation for investment banks has been covered by Chemmanur and Ful-
ghieri (1994) which focus on the moral hazard problem that investment banks face while
setting their evaluation standards and not on the problem of manipulation of information.
Morgan and Stocken (2003) develops a static cheap talk model of information revelation for
financial analysts whose compensation, paid out by the investment bank, is contingent on the
recommendation issued by the financial analyst. This differs from the model develop here be-
cause the rating agency’s fee is paid upfront by the entrepreneur that requires rating services
and before any assessment has been performed by the agency. This is common practice with
rating agencies.
In the literature on rating agencies, Cantor and Packer (1995) provide an extensive survey
on the ratings industry and on the theoretical side, Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006)
develop a rationale for ratings as a way to coordinate investors and to avoid multiple equilibria.
This paper is also closely related to the theoretical literature on career concerns, whose
seminal paper is Holmstrom (1999, 1982). Later developments are for example, Scharfstein
and Stein (1990), or Trueman (1994) and Graham (1999) on career concerns and herd behavior
of firm managers and financial analysts, respectively, and Boot, Milbourn and Thakor (2005)
on the delegation of ideas.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the basic characteristics
of the monopolistic model and section 3 contains the equilibrium analysis and comparative
statics. In Section 4 competition is introduced and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model: The Monopolistic Case
In this economy, there are three different classes of risk-neutral agents at each time period:
an entrepreneur, one rating agency and a large group of homogeneous investors. The model
lasts for two time periods t, with t={1,2}, and there is no discounting.3
2.1 The Project and Public Information
At each time period there is an entrepreneur who wants to implement an idea for a investment
project that costs 12 . At the end of the period the project yields a cash-flow that equals 1
if the project is good (G) and 0 if the project is bad (B). In this case, the entrepreneur is
protected by limited liability and the liquidation value is zero.
The entrepreneur has initial wealth w, with w < 12 , and derives a non-monetary private
benefit of B from undertaking the project. He knows the project’s type but the existence of
a private benefit ensures that even an entrepreneur with a bad project wants to undertake it.
Investors have access to unlimited funds and want to participate in the project. I abstract
from issues of capital structure and assume that the entrepreneur at time period t raises the
required financing for the project by issuing debt claims with a promised repayment Dt to be
paid at the end of the period. These debt claims need to be rated as the institutional and
legal regime establishes that ratings are mandatory.
Both investors and the rating agency do not know the project’s type ex-ante but general
conditions of the economy determine a common prior belief over it. Therefore, a project is
good with probability equal to θ, with θ ∈ (0, 1). This probability summarizes the public
information about the project’s type and for simplicity, it is assumed to be exogenous and
3Obviously, rating agencies operate for more than two periods, however a two-period model adds expositional
simplicity to the analysis while still capturing the importance of reputation. The implications of this assumption
are discussed below.
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constant over time.
2.2 The Rating Agency’s Objective and Private Information
The rating agency is hired by the entrepreneur who pays it an upfront fee as common practice
with rating agencies. This fee is set by the rating agency at the beginning of each time
period to maximize profits while leaving the entrepreneur indifferent between hiring a rating
agency or not. This implicitly assumes that the rating agency has the bargaining power and
appropriates the full value of a rating to an entrepreneur. There are three reasons to ascribe
so much power to the rating agency: ratings are mandatory, there is a single rating agency
and the project’s payoff together with the private benefit can be assumed to be high enough
such that the entrepreneur has more to lose if the project is not undertaken than the rating
agency has to lose by not being hired. Alternatively, the rating agency and the entrepreneur
could Nash-bargain over the fee. This would add complexity to the model without changing
its qualitative results.
The entrepreneur’s initial wealth w is taken to be high enough to cover this fee but low
enough to prevent him from offering bribes to the rating agency in an attempt to influence
ratings. This is to eliminate distortions to the behavior of the rating agency that would bias
it towards issuing good ratings.4 The rating agency has no initial wealth and the rating is
always made public and at no extra cost for investors.5 6
After being hired, the rating agency collects private information about the project. This
private information takes the form of a private signal that can be of two types: sG indicates
that the project is good and sB indicates that the project is bad. The quality of the private
signal depends on the rating agency’s ability, denoted by a, which can be high (H) or low (L).
4The fact that there is no repeated interaction between the rating agency and the entrepreneur in this
model makes the offer of bribes quite ineffective. If the rating agency pockets the bribe before the rating is
announced, once it receives the money it has no incentives to report differently from its first best anymore. But
if the entrepreneur waits until the rating is made public, then the rating agency knows that an entrepreneur
with a good rating is going to fail on the bribe payment.
5The zero wealth assumption rules out negative fees, i.e. situations in which the rating agency pays the
entrepreneur to rate the project at time period 1 in an attempt to boost reputation and recover this money at
time period 2.
6All that is needed is for investors to known that the entrepreneur hired a rating agency. Whenever a rating
is not made public they can infer that this rating must have been bad as it is in the entrepreneur’s best interest
to always make a good rating available to investors.
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An H rating agency collects a private signal that reveals the project’s type, while an L rating
agency collects a noisy private signal. The probability αt represents the subjective belief that
a rating agency is of type H at time period t, with α1 ∈ (0, 1) and α2 derived endogenously. I
refer to this probability as the rating agency’s reputation at time period t. The rating agency
learns its type after being hired at time period 1 and the other agents learn about it over
time.7
Therefore, an H rating agency always identifies the project s type which means that:
Pr (sG | G,H) = Pr (sB | B,H) = 1,
and
Pr (sG | B,H) = Pr (sB | G,H) = 0. (1)
An L rating agency makes small mistakes which means that:
Pr (sG | G,L) = Pr (sB | B,L) = ε
and
Pr (sG | B,L) = Pr (sB | G,L) = 1− ε. (2)
where ε ∈ [12 , 1) measures the quality of the private signal. It is assumed that ε > 1−θ which
will later be shown to be necessary to make requesting a rating valuable for the entrepreneur.
The costs of collecting the private signal are assumed to be arbitrarily small and the effort
exerted to collect this signal is assumed to be observable and verifiable. This ensures that a
rating agency requires a positive fee for assigning a rating to a project and allows the paper
to abstract from moral hazard issues.
7This can be interpreted as having a rating agency employing a credit analyst. At the time the analyst
is hired the rating agency is unsure about how good she is or whether she is going to conduct due diligence
investigations on the bonds she is rating, and learns about it by working with her. Or, it can refer to a situation
in which a rating agency faces the task of assigning a rating to a new financial instrument and is unsure about
how good its credit model is to assess this instrument. This assumption allows the paper to focus on the most
interesting case in which a rating agency cannot use the fee charged to the entrepreneur as a signal to reveal
its type. If this was the case, reputation would not play any role.
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The rating agency uses this private signal and the prior belief about the project’s type to
assign a rating to a project.8 There are two types of ratings: a good rating rG and a bad
rating rB. A bad rating can be interpreted as a non-investment grade rating and a good rating
can be interpreted as an investment grade rating. A bad rating implies that no funding is
provided for the project or that this funding is provided by different sources, like bank loans
or venture capital, on terms that are not comparable. This captures the fact that in reality
some of the largest purchasers of fixed-income securities, for example institutional investors,
are often governed by investment rules that require them to invest only in securities that are
rated investment grade. This makes it much harder, or even impossible, for an entrepreneur
issuing securities that are rated non-investment grade to be successful at raising funds.9
The rating agency can issue a rating that does not coincide with the private signal but
whenever this happens it incurs in a cost denoted by c. This cost is assumed to be independent
of the rating agency’s type and of the quality of the private signal and can be arbitrarily
small. One way to interpret this cost is related to the process of assigning a rating. During
this process, rating agencies assign an analyst to evaluate a project and to come up with a
rating report, but the analyst’s evaluation is subject to a review by a committee formed inside
the rating agency which can request changes to the rating report (and to the rating itself)
before it becomes public. This requires time and effort to write a new report and to make
sure that such rating is justifiable in case it is challenged or the rating agency is subject to an
inquiry or a lawsuit. The equilibrium probabilities that at each time period a rating agency
with ability a issues a rating that does not coincide with the private signal, i.e. Pr(rG | sB, a)
8In this setting unsolicited ratings are meaningless as these ratings would be based on public information
and would not provide new information to investors.
9This assumption could be relaxed and it could be derived within the model when a project is in fact
undertaken for a given rating. It would still be the case that a bad rating would lead, in most circumstances,
to no funding being provided. And if not, all that is needed to generate the qualitative results presented below
is that the rating agency’s reputation is less sensitive to the outcome of bad rating than to the outcome of a
good rating. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that supports the fact that it is more damaging for a rating
agency’s reputation when investors lose money after investing in a security which turns out to be overrated
than the opposite. And when a project financed with debt issued a bad rating does fail it is very difficult
to say if the project was indeed bad or if the failure was not simply precipitated by the rating itself, which
makes it hard to evaluate the rating agency’s work. This is because bad ratings are often associated with
higher borrowing costs, difficulties to raise financing or problems to convince creditors to roll-over existing debt
obligations and consequent sale of the firm’s assets to raise funds, all of which make a failure much more likely
to occur.
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and Pr(rB | sG, a), are denoted by γt and γt respectively.
2.3 Investors’ Objective
Investor use the rating, their subjective belief that the rating is correct, and the other variables
that are common knowledge to evaluate a project. They decide whether to invest in the
project and which promised repayment Dt to require for doing so. Only when they invest
the project is undertaken. The cash-flows of the project are realized and publicly observed at
the end of the period. At this point, all claims are settled and investors update their belief
about the rating agency’s type, by comparing the rating to the outcome of the project. This
updated belief, which is generally denoted by α2, is equal to one of the following three values:
α2 (rG, G), α2 (rG, B) or α2 (rB). Therefore, α2 (rG, G) denotes the posterior belief that the
rating agency is of type H given the it correctly assigns a good rating to a good project,
i.e. Pr(H | rG, G); α2 (rG, B) denotes the posterior belief that the rating agency is of type H
given that it incorrectly assigns a good rating to a bad project, i.e. Pr(H | rG, B); and finally,
α2 (rB) denotes the posterior belief that the rating agency is of type H given that it issues a
bad rating, i.e. Pr(H | rB).
The game is then repeated with a new project and a new entrepreneur who knows the
outcome at time period 1. The sequence of events and the notation presented so far are
summarized in Figure 1 and in Table 1 respectively.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
An equilibrium consists of the optimal choices at each time period by the rating agency of γt
and γt that maximize profits and of investors on whether to invest. Investors determine the
promised repayment Dt, and the fee that the entrepreneur is willing to pay for rating services
is calculated based on Dt, θ, αt, ε, γt and γt.
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The entrepreneur hires the rating agency and agrees on the fee.
The rating agency collects the private signal and issues a rating.
Investors observe the rating and decide whether to invest.
The project’s cash-flows are realized if investment has taken place and all claims are settled.
Investors update beliefs about the rating agency’s type.
The game is repeated with a new entrepreneur and project.Time 2
Time 1
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
3.1 The Promised Repayment to Investors and the Rating Agency Fee
Without a rating the entrepreneur cannot undertake the project and keeps the initial wealth
w. If he asks for a rating he uses w to pay for the rating agency’s fee and by assumption
has funds left that he can use to invest in the project. These funds represent a cheaper
source of financing than outside funds. But given that the rating agency can set the fee, it
fully appropriates the expected value in excess of w generated by the project. So there is no
advantage for the entrepreneur from investing his own funds in the project. For analytical
simplicity suppose that the entrepreneur does indeed raise 12 in debt. Using the assumptions
that the fee is paid upfront before the rating is known, a bad rating implies no investment
and there is limited liability, an entrepreneur with a good project at time period t pays a fee
equal to:
Pr (rG | G, t) (1−Dt) , (3)
where Pr (rG | G, t) is the probability that a good rating is assigned to a good project at time
period t. An entrepreneur with a bad project knows that the expected value generated by
his project is going to be zero however he wants to enjoy the private benefit, therefore he is
willing to pay the same fee that an entrepreneur with a good project pays in order not to
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Table 1: Summary of notation
B Entrepreneur’s private benefit
w Entrepreneur’s initial wealth
t time, t={1, 2}
Dt Promised repayment to investors at time period t
θ Prior probability of a G project, θ ∈ (0, 1)
sG, sB Good and bad private signal
rG, rB Good and bad rating
a Rating agency’s ability, a={H,L}
αt Probability of an H rating agency at time period t
ε Quality of an L rating agency’s private signal, ε ∈ ˆ 12 , 1´
c Cost of misreporting the private signal
α2 (rG, G) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when rG is assigned to a G-project
α2 (rG, B) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when rG is assigned to a B-project
α2 (rB) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when rB is issued
γt Probability of deviating from a bad private signal at time period t
γt Probability of deviating from a good private signal at time period t
reveal his type.10 Note that when investors contribute with the investment funds it is because
Dt < 1 and the fee paid to the rating agency is positive.
The investors’ market is competitive and risk neutral, hence the promised repayment to
investors is determined at each time period using the investors’ participation constraint defined
as follows:
Pr (G | rG, t)Dt = 12 .
Using Bayes’ rule, it can be derived that:
Dt =
Pr (rG| t)
2Pr (G) Pr (rG | G, t) . (4)
The entrepreneur has ex-ante the same information about the rating agency’s type as investors
have when they are confronted with a rating. Hence, Pr (rG | G, t) in expressions (3) and (4)
10One implicit assumption is that the private benefit more than compensates the entrepreneur (in utility
terms) for the value of the fee.
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coincide. Given this, substituting (4) in (3) the fee at time period t becomes:
Pr (G) Pr (rG | G, t)− Pr (B) Pr (rG | B, t)
2Pr (G)
. (5)
3.2 Time Period 2 (No Reputational Concerns)
When hired at time period 2 the rating agency receives the fee for this time period and
subsequently collects the private signal. Then, it decides on the rating to issue. It takes
this decision to maximize future profits which are equal to zero as the game ends after time
period 2. And it costs c to deviate from the private signal which implies that a rating
agency minimizes costs by always issuing the private signal as a rating regardless of its type.
Therefore, both γ2 and γ2 are equal to zero.
Given this, the conditional probabilities Pr (rG | G, 2) and Pr (rG | B, 2) are equal to α2 +
(1− α2) ε and (1− α2) (1− ε) respectively and the fee at time period 2 is derived using (5).
To make the dependence of the rating agency’s fee on its reputation explicit this fee is denoted
by F (α2) and is given by:
F (α2) =
α2 (1− ε) + θ − (1− ε)
2θ
. (6)
The fee is increasing in the reputational level α2. It is easier to understand why this happens
by looking at expression (3). As the reputational level increases the repayment amount Dt
that investors demand after a good rating becomes lower as this rating becomes less likely to
represent a mistake from an L rating agency. And for the same reason Pr (rG | G, t) increases.
Both effects act to increase the value created by a rating to the entrepreneur and therefore
increase the fee. As a result, a rating agency acts to maximize reputation in order to maximize
fees.
This fee is always positive because ε > 1 − θ. This means that even if the entrepreneur
and investors know that they are dealing with an L rating agency at time period 2, the
quality of the private signal is high enough to make the entrepreneur with a good project
reasonably confident that the rating agency is going to correctly identify it, and to make
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investors contribute with the funds after a good rating. Consequently, rating services are
valuable to the entrepreneur. This assumption is not necessary to solve the model but it
simplifies it and allows the paper to to abstract from the hiring decision of the entrepreneur
and to focus on the most interesting part, which is to derive the behavior of the rating agency.
By doing so, it also facilitates the comparison of the results derived here in section 3 to the
results derived for a duopolistic ratings industry in section 4.
3.3 Time Period 1 (Reputational Concerns)
3.3.1 Rating Agency Optimal Behavior
When hired at time period 1 the rating agency receives the fee for this time period, collects
the private signal and then decides on the rating to issue. It takes this decision to maximize
future profits. If a rating agency with ability a and a good private signal issues the private
signal as a rating it will receive F (α2 (rG, G)) at time period 2 if this rating is correct and
the project turns out to good, and F (α2 (rG, B)) otherwise. Its future profit is given by the
expected fee at time period 2 which is equal to:
Pr (G | sG, a)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sG, a)F (α2 (rG, B)) .
If the rating agency does not issue the private signal as a rating its future profit is certain
and equal to F (α2 (rB)) − c, where F (α2 (rB)) is the fee at time period 2 and c is the cost
of misreporting the private signal at time period 1. The rating agency issues the rating that
generates the highest future profit. That is to say that, in equilibrium, the sign of:
Pr (G | sG, a)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sG, a)F (α2 (rG, B))− (F (α2 (rB))− c) , (7)
is positive (negative) when the rating agency follows (contradicts) the private signal and (7)
is equal to zero when the rating agency is indifferent. In this case the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies.
Likewise for the case of a bad private signal. If the rating agency issues the private signal
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as a rating, the future profit is equal to F (α2 (rB)). But if the rating agency does not issue
the private signal as a rating the future profit is given by the expected fee at time period 2
and the cost of misreporting the private signal at time period 1, which is equal to:
Pr (G | sB, a)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sB, a)F (α2 (rG, B))− c.
In equilibrium, the sign of:
Pr (G | sB, a)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sB, a)F (α2 (rG, B))− c− F (α2 (rB)) (8)
is negative (positive) when the rating agency follows (contradicts) the private signal and (8)
is equal to zero when the rating agency is indifferent.
The results when the cost of misreporting tends to zero can be generalized by Proposition
1. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of this proposition.
Proposition 1 The behavior of a rating agency at time period 1 is such that:
1. An H rating agency always issues the private signal as a rating: it issues a good rating
whenever it collects a good private signal, and it issues a bad rating whenever it collects
a bad private signal.
2. There are θ and θ, with 12 < θ < ε < θ, such that, for θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
, an L rating agency
always issues the private signal as a rating. Otherwise, the rating agency behaves as
follows:
For θ ∈ (θ, 1), it issues a good rating whenever it collects a good private signal, and
it issues a good rating with probability 0 < γ1 < 1 and a bad rating with probability
1− γ1 whenever it collects a bad private signal.
For θ ∈ (1− ε, θ) it issues a bad rating whenever it collects a bad private signal, and
it issues a bad rating with probability 0 < γ1 ≤ 1 and a good rating with probability
1− γ1 whenever it collects a good private signal.
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Region (a) Region (b)
1− ε 11/2 θ ε θ¯
Figure 2: Equilibrium behavior of an L rating agency with reputational concerns as a function
of θ
Region (a): When the private signal is sB , the rating agency issues rB ; when the private signal is
sG, it issues rB with probability γ1 and rG otherwise. Between θ and θ it issues the private signal
as a rating. Region (b): When the private signal is sG, it issues rG; when the private signal is sB ,
it issues rG with probability γ1 and rB otherwise.
The full proof of this proposition is relegated to section 6.1 of the Appendix but the main
intuition is presented next. For a better exposition of the results I characterize a project in
the following way:
Definition 1 A project is expected to be good (or very good) based on public information for
θ > 12 and close to
1
2 (for θ >
1
2 and close to 1) and it is expected to be bad (or very bad) for
θ < 12 and close to
1
2 (for θ <
1
2 and close to 0).
11
The starting point is to show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which an H rating
agency issues a rating that goes against the private signal. To prove this result note that
at time period 2 a rating agency always issues the private signal as a rating regardless of its
type. Therefore, because investors and entrepreneurs value a correct rating, the fee at time
period 2 increases the more likely it is that the rating agency is of type H. This gives an L
rating agency incentives to mimic the behavior of an H rating agency at time period 1. From
here, it is straightforward to show the result. This is done by contradiction. If, for example,
an H rating agency always issues a good (bad) rating regardless of the private signal, then an
L rating agency would also always issue a good (bad) rating. But this would not constitute
an equilibrium as the H rating agency would then prefer to issue a bad (good) rating to try
to distinguish itself from an L rating agency and reveal its true type. Situations in which an
H rating agency plays a mixed strategy can also be ruled out following a similar argument.
Using this result, it is shown that the behavior of an L rating agency is characterized by
conformism and conservatism. When investors expect the project to be very good (very bad
11Note that θ → 0 when ε→ 1.
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or bad) based on public information and the rating agency’s private information indicates
that the project is bad (good), there are situations in which it chooses to issue a good (bad)
rating. I refer to this behavior as conformism.12 This happens because when the project is
expected to be very good (very bad or bad) based on public information the L rating agency
knows that, had it been an H rating agency, it would have been more likely to have collected
a good (bad) private signal.
But when a project is expected to be good based on public information there are situations
in which an L rating agency chooses to contradict this information even when the agency’s
private information indicates that the project is good, and issues a bad rating. I refer to
this behavior as conservatism. This happens because the L rating agency wants to minimize
reputational costs, measured in terms of the fee at time period 2. If an L rating agency that
collects a good private signal chooses to issue a good rating and this rating is correct, the
rating agency manages to boost reputation and consequently, the fee at time period 2. But
if such rating is incorrect, the rating agency’s type is revealed and the fee at time period 2 is
very low. So the rating agency attempts to eliminate this possibility by hiding its true type
behind a bad rating which is not verifiable. In this way, the rating agency’s reputation might
not be boosted but it will definitely remain reasonably unscathed. The same happens to the
fee at time period 2.13
3.3.2 Comparative Statics
A number of interesting results can be derived when performing comparative statics in the
equilibrium values of γ1 and γ1. The derivations are in section 6.2 of the Appendix.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium probabilities γ1 and γ1 are monotonic and:
1. always increasing and decreasing, respectively, in the value of the prior belief θ;
12This result is directly related to the issue of conformity. A number of papers such as Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 1998) and Brandenburger and Polak (1996) discuss this topic.
13Conservatism is discussed in Zwiebel (1995), although the application here is quite different. The idea in
Zwiebel’s paper is that reputational concerns may lead managers to refrain from undertaking innovations that
are first order stochastically dominant because of the downside risk of being fired.
18
2. decreasing in the quality of the private signal ε, for most values of the prior belief θ;
3. always decreasing and increasing, respectively, in the initial reputational level α1;
4. always decreasing in the cost of misreporting c.
Point 1. means that the more extreme the public information is, the higher the probability
of conforming with this information: the worse (better) the public information is, the higher
the probability of sending a bad (good) rating when facing a good (bad) private signal.
Point 2. is an intuitive result: increasing the quality level of the private signal lowers the
rating agency’s incentive to ignore it. This always happens for the case of γ1. However, it
cannot be excluded that γ1 increases in the quality of the private signal for high values of
θ > 12 and close to the threshold θ.
14 In this case, a project is expected to be good based on
public information and a more precise private signal decreases the ex-ante probability that
an L rating agency is going to collect a bad private signal. Other things equal, an L rating
agency is now expected to issue bad (good) ratings less (more) frequently than before. This
in turn means that investors believe they are more (less) likely to be dealing with an H (L)
rating agency when they see a bad rating and are less able to differentiate between an H and
an L rating agency when they see a correct good rating. The L rating agency, whose objective
is to mimic the behavior of an H rating agency, reacts by issuing bad ratings more frequently,
i.e. by increasing γ1.
An increase in the quality level of the private signal can take many forms in practice, for
example through a policy towards making the agencies models of risk assessment more robust
combined with increased efforts to train and retain qualified staff.
Point 3. means that the behavior of the L rating agency is such that as the initial repu-
tational level increases, it tends to issue bad ratings more often than good ones. An increase
in the initial reputational level has a positive impact in the reputational level at time period
2, both after a good or a bad rating have been issued at time period 1, and therefore it has
14If this effect exists it is going to be for a very restricted interval of the prior belief θ. But because it is not
possible to provide closed-form solutions for γ1 and the several parameters can be combined in many different
ways, it is not possible to exclude that such region does exist.
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a positive impact in the fee. But the increase in the latter is certain and the increase in the
former only occurs if the good rating is correct. Otherwise, the rating agency is identified
as a type L, the reputational level at time period 2 is equal to zero and the fee decreases
accordingly. As the initial reputational level increases, the reputational cost that a rating
agency faces from having its type revealed, in terms of the fees that it forgoes, increases. In
view of this, a more reputable agency has less incentives to gamble by issuing a good rating.
Point 4. is a straightforward result: as deviating from the private signal becomes more
costly, issuing a rating that does not coincide with this signal becomes less frequent. In reality,
it is the case that different agencies look at different criteria to define and assign a rating.
This gives scope to different possibilities to interpret and to use the information collected
about the firms and debt instruments that are being rated, which means that c is in practice
very low. By being clearer about the meaning of ratings and about what exactly a rating
should reflect, regulators would make the ratings process more rigorous and rating agencies
more accountable for their ratings and easier to monitor.
3.4 Value of a Rating and Reputational Concerns
It was derived above that a monopolistic rating agency can ignore the private signal when
it issues a rating at time period 1, which is the time period for which the rating agency has
reputational concerns. To determine to what extent this is generated by these concerns, the
results from Proposition 1 should be contrasted to what a rating agency would do if its sole
concern was to maximize the value created by assigning a rating to a project at time period 1.
Given the bargaining assumptions considered between the entrepreneur and the rating agency,
this value is given by the fee at time period 1 which is defined by expression (5). The fee can
take one of the following forms. First, when the rating agency deviates from a good private
signal Pr (rG | G, 1) = α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
)
and Pr (rG | B, 1) = (1− α1) (1− ε)
(
1− γ1
)
.
As a result the fee charged at time period 1, denoted by F (α1), is equal to:
F (α1) =
α1 (1− ε) + θ − (1− ε)− (1− α1) (θ − (1− ε)) γ1
2θ
. (9)
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Second, when a rating agency deviates from a bad private signal Pr (rG | G, 1) = α1 +
(1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1) and Pr (rG | B, 1) = (1− α1) (1− ε+ εγ1). It follows that the fee
at time period 1 is given by:
F (α1) =
α1 (1− ε) + θ − (1− ε) + (1− α1) (θ − ε) γ1
2θ
. (10)
Third, when a rating agency does not deviate from the private signal, the fee at time period
1 is calculated by setting γ1 = 0 in expression (9) or γ1 = 0 in expression (10).15
The fees are maximized when γ1 = 0 for θ > 1 − ε and when γ1 = 0 for θ < ε. But for
θ > ε, expression (10) is maximized when γ1 = 1. This means that in order to maximize the
value created by assigning a rating to a project, an L rating agency should issue the private
signal as a rating for 1− ε < θ < ε but it should issue a good rating regardless of the private
signal for θ > ε. Note that this is the result that would have been obtained had the rating
agency just wanted to minimize mistakes. If this was the case, an H rating agency would
always issue the private signal as a rating. An L rating agency would issue a good rating
after a good private signal if Pr (G | sG, L) ≥ Pr (B | sG, L). Consequently, the rating agency
would issue a good rating for θ > 1 − ε, and a bad rating otherwise. Similarly, an L rating
agency would issue a bad rating after a bad private signal if Pr (B | sB, L) ≥ Pr (G | sB, L)
or equivalently, the rating agency would issue a bad rating for θ < ε, and a good rating
otherwise. See Figure 3 for an illustration of these results.
Region (b)
1− ε 11/2 θ ε θ¯
Figure 3: Equilibrium behavior of an L rating agency that maximizes the value created by
assigning a rating as a function of θ
Region (b): When the private signal is sG, the rating agency issues rG; when the private signal is
sB , it issues rG with probability γ1 equal to 1. Between 1− ε and ε, it issues the private signal as
a rating.
15Note that even though the fee at time period 2 is always positive by assumption, the fee given by expression
(9) does not have to be positive for the parameter values considered by the model. This implies that the rating
agency would not be hired at time period 1 and if hired at time period 2 it would not have reputational
concerns.
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Comparing figures 2 and 3, it can be seen that the fact that an L rating agency with
reputational concerns conforms to public information to the detriment of private information
when a project is expected to be very good based on public information can be justified as
an attempt of the rating agency to minimize mistakes. However, it conforms less to public
information than a rating agency that wants to minimize mistakes. Moreover, the rating
agency ignores private information that indicates that a project is good when a project is
expected to be bad based on public information more often than a rating agency that wants
to minimize mistakes and acts conservatively by ignoring both private and public information
in situations in which a project is expected to be good. This difference in behavior measures
the effect of reputational concerns which often reduce the value created by assigning a rating
to a project.
Corollary 1 An L rating agency with reputational concerns issues an excessive number of bad
ratings relative to a rating agency that just wants to maximize the value created by assigning
a rating to a project (or to minimize mistakes).
3.5 More Time Periods
In a model with another time period, for example time period 0, the rating agency would
choose the rating to issue at time period 0 based on the expected fee at time period 1 and on
the expected fee at time period 2 given the optimal action at time period 1, both generally
increasing in reputation. Then a correct good rating at time period 0 would increase the
future profit but an incorrect good rating at time 0 means that the rating agency’s type
would already be revealed at time 0 and that the future profit would be permanently low.
Issuing a bad rating even when faced with a good private signal at time period 0 could still
be at least as good as issuing a good rating, in particular for a rating agency whose quality
of the private information is low and/or the initial reputational level is high, as this would be
the agency that benefits the most from hiding its true type.
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4 The Competitive Setting
The focus of the paper so far has been on the strategic information revelation of a monopolistic
rating agency. However, it would be interesting to contrast this situation to what happens
when there is competition in the ratings industry. Competition is modeled in a very stylized
manner. Consider the framework developed in section 2 but with two rating agencies that at
each time period compete to rate the project. The fact that only one rating agency is hired
at each time period makes the competitive setting quite aggressive even with only two rating
agencies in the industry. Not allowing for the two rating agencies to be sequentially hired in
the same time period simplifies the model but without significantly changing the qualitative
results. In this case it is likely that there would herding in the sense that, when in doubt the
rating agency that issues the second rating would choose to issue a rating that coincides with
the first rating that was issued.16 But in this case, it is the behavior of the rating agency that
issues the first rating that is crucial, and there is no reason to expect this rating agency to
behave differently from the rating agency that is hired in the model presented here.17
There are many ways to motivate a one-rating scenario within the model. The entrepreneur
may be facing a situation in which investment timing is crucial to guarantee the success of the
project. In this case, the entrepreneur faces a time constraint and waiting for a second rating
could effectively mean that the second rating agency is assessing a different and considerably
worse project, which may be unworthy to pursue. Alternatively, the entrepreneur may be
credit constrained and unable to pay for a second rating.
Each rating agency, denoted by i and j, has an initial reputational level that for simplicity
and to facilitate the comparison to the monopolistic case, is the same for the two agencies and
equal to the initial reputational level of the rating agency in Section 2, i.e. αi1 = αj1 = α1. In
this case, the two rating agencies are ex-ante identical and the entrepreneur is equally likely
to hire any of them at time period 1. At time period 2, the reputational level of the rating
16Or eventually a more risky strategy of anti-herding in an attempt to discredit the competitor. See for
example Effinger and Polborn (2001) or Trueman (1994) and Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) for an analysis
of herding and anti-herding behavior in the context of firms and financial analysts.
17They would both base their ratings on public information and on the private signal and they would both
want to maximize reputation to maximize fees.
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Table 3: Revised notation for rating agency i
Dit Promised repayment to investors at time period t
siG, siB Good and bad private signal
riG, riB Good and bad rating
αit Probability of an H rating agency at time period t
F (αit) Rating agency’s fee
α2 (riG, G) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when riG is assigned to a G-project
α2 (riG, B) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when riG is assigned to a B-project
α2 (riB) Probability of an H rating agency at time period 2 when riB is issued
γit Probability of deviating from a bad private signal at time period t
γit Probability of deviating from a good private signal at time period t
ε, c Variables that do not vary with the rating agency
agency that is hired at time period 1 is updated as before, and the reputational level of the
competitor remains equal to α1. The subscripts i and j are added to the variables defined
above to identify the rating agency. Table 3 revises the notation for rating agency i.
4.1 The Promised Repayment to Investors and the Rating Agency Fee
The promised repayment to investors is given by expression (4) as before. However, the
fee is calculated in a different way: rating agencies make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the en-
trepreneur. The process that generates the fee is similar to the process that generates the
price in a Bertrand model. Let i be the rating agency that is hired at time period t. Then,
the entrepreneur makes an expected profit of Pr (riG | G, t) (1−Dit) − F (αit). However, for
the entrepreneur to accept the offer from rating agency i, this profit needs to be at least as
high as what the entrepreneur would have made had he accepted the offer from rating agency
j. This is given by Pr (rjG | G, t) (1−Djt) − F (αjt). So for rating agency i to be hired it
has to be that Pr (riG | G, t) (1−Dit) exceeds Pr (rjG | G, t) (1−Djt) such that even if rating
agency j sets a zero fee, the entrepreneur still prefers to hire rating agency i. In this case
the fee is simply equal to Pr (riG | G, t) (1−Dit)−Pr (rjG | G, t) (1−Djt) which is the differ-
ence between the fees that i and j would have charged the entrepreneur had they been in a
monopolistic setting. Using expression (5) this fee at time period t can be written as follows:
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Pr (G) [Pr (riG | G, t)− Pr (rjG | G, t)]− Pr (B) [Pr (riG | B, t)− Pr (rjG | B, t)]
2 Pr (G)
.
Since the two rating agencies are ex-ante identical, then Pr (riG | G, 1) = Pr (rjG | G, 1) and
Pr (riG | B, 1) = Pr (rjG | B, 1), which means that the fee at time period 1 is arbitrarily small
as it only needs to covers the costs of collecting the private signal.18 The fee at time period
2 is derived next.
4.2 Time Period 2 (No Reputational Concerns)
Let i be the rating agency that is hired at time period 2. Following the same argument as in
the monopolistic case, this rating agency always issues the private signal as a rating regardless
of its type. Therefore the fee at time period 2 simplifies to:
F (αi2) =
(1− ε) (αi2 − αj2)
2θ
. (11)
Note that now, not only does a rating agency want to maximize reputation but it also needs
a reputational level that is higher than the competitor’s reputational level to be hired by the
entrepreneur at time period 2.
4.3 Time Period 1 (Reputational Concerns)
Let i also be the rating agency that is hired at time period 1. This is without loss of generality.
As in the monopolistic case, the rating agency is going to compare the future profits after
issuing a good rating to the future profits after issuing a bad rating. The results for the case
in which the cost of misreporting tends to zero are derived in section 6.3 in the Appendix
18Negative fees are ruled by the assumption that rating agencies do not have initial wealth. However the
results would not change if this was not the case. First, note that no one would set a negative fee at time
period 2 as this is the last period. At time period 1 however, rating agencies could start a race to decrease
fees below zero attempting to be hired by the entrepreneur. But this would be of no use because since rating
agencies do not know their type until they start working, they are ex-ante identical, and they would both be
willing to pay exactly the same amount to have the chance to be hired at time period. But they would still be
regarded as identical by the entrepreneur.
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and can be summarized by Proposition 3. Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of this
proposition.
Proposition 3 The behavior of rating agency i is such that:
1. An H rating agency always issues the private signal as a rating: it issues a good rating
whenever it collects a good private signal, and it issues a bad rating whenever it collects
a bad private signal.
2. There are θc and θc, with 1 − ε < θc < θc < 12 , such that for θ ∈
[
θc, θc
]
, an L rating
agency always issues the private signal as a rating. Otherwise, the rating agency behaves
as follows:
For θ ∈ (θc, 1), it issues a good rating whenever it collects a good private signal,
and it issues a good rating with probability 0 < γi1 < 1, with γi1 > γ1, and a bad
rating with probability 1− γi1 whenever it collects a bad private signal.
For θ ∈ (1− ε, θc) it issues a bad rating whenever it collects a bad private signal,
and it issues a bad rating with probability 0 < γi1 < 1, with γi1 < γ1, and a good
rating with probability 1− γi1 whenever it collects a good private signal.
Region (b)Region (a)
1− ε 1θc θc 1/2 θ ε θ¯
Figure 4: Equilibrium behavior of an L rating agency in competition as a function of θ
Region (a): When the private signal is siB the rating agency issues riB ; when the private signal
is siG it issues riB with probability γi1 and riG otherwise. Between θc and θc it issues the private
signal as a rating. Region (b): When the private signal is siG it issues riG; when the private signal
is siB it issues riG with probability γi1 and riB otherwise.
Comparing Figures 2 and 4 it is clear that in a competitive setting a rating agency still
maintains some of the conformist behavior of the monopolistic rating agency. However, it
issues good ratings more often than before. There are some differences with respect to the
monopolistic case that explain these results. Issuing a good rating is risky for an L rating
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agency because it allows investors and entrepreneurs to compare the rating to the outcome
of the project. If the outcome of the project differs from the rating, the rating agency is
identified as being of type L and its reputational level becomes zero. In a competitive setting,
and contrarily to what happened in a monopoly, the rating agency is not going to be hired at
time period 2 since the entrepreneur prefers hiring the most reputable rating agency and the
competitor has a reputational level equal to α1. However, issuing a bad rating can also be risky.
Since a bad rating is not verifiable, reputation is not necessarily boosted after such rating.
And when a project is expected to be good or very good based on public information, issuing
a bad rating can actually worsen the rating agency’s reputation as investors believe that the
rating agency is likely to be mistaken or/and hiding its true type. As a result, the reputational
level at time period 2 also does not necessarily exceed the competitor’s reputational level α1.
Given this, in a competitive setting an L rating agency that collects a good private signal
needs to consider two effects. First, if it issues a good rating it now faces a higher reputational
cost of a mistake as it is not going to be hired at time period 2. This effect is stronger
discouraging the revelation of a good private signal than in the monopolistic case but it is
capped at zero as the rating agency is only penalized through the loss of business. Second,
there is also a reputational cost associated to a bad rating as a rating agency can be perceived
as being of type L. This effect is stronger encouraging the revelation of a good private signal
than in the monopolistic case.
When a project is expected to be good or very good based on public information, the
second effect dominates. In order to be hired at time period 2 a rating agency needs to
persuade investors that they are likely to be dealing with an H rating agency. Hence, a rating
agency that collects a good private signal always chooses to issue a good rating and there are
situations in which even a rating agency that collects a bad private signal chooses to ignore
it and issue a good rating.
When a project is expected to be bad based on public information, the second effect does
not exist but it turns out that the first effect is not enough to keep the conservative behavior
that characterizes a monopolistic rating agency. This is because the reputational cost of a
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mistake is too low as it is is capped at zero. Consequently, an L rating agency has more to
gain if it manages to persuade investors and entrepreneurs that they are likely to be dealing
with an H rating agency than to lose if a mistake reveals its true type. Hence, a rating agency
that collects a good private signal still chooses to issue a good rating and the behavior of
a rating agency that collects a bad private signal is characterized by boldness. This means
that when a project is expected to be bad based on public information there are situations
in which an L rating agency chooses to contradict this information even when the agency’s
private information indicates that the project is bad, and issues a good rating.
The comparative statics results to the equilibrium values of γi1 and γi1 yield similar results
to the monopolistic case. The derivations are in the Appendix.
4.4 Value of a Rating and Reputational Concerns
It would be interesting to contrast the behavior of a rating agency in a competitive setting
with the results derived in Section 3.4. Note that now the value created by assigning a rating
to a project is given by the same expressions as in the competitive case but these expression
no longer represent the fee at time period 1. The value created by assigning a rating to a
project at time period 1 is now appropriated by the entrepreneur.
In a competitive setting an L rating agency with reputational concerns also attempts to
minimize mistakes (or to maximize the value created by assigning a rating to a project) by
conforming to public information when a project is expected to be very good or very bad
based on this information. However, for a wide range of values of the prior belief θ the rating
agency issues too many good ratings relative to an agency that wants to minimize mistakes.
This means that:
Corollary 2 An L rating agency with reputational concerns issues an excessive number of
good ratings relative to a rating agency that just wants to maximize the value created by
assigning a rating to a project (or to minimize mistakes) for a wide range of values of the
prior belief θ.
It is also not the case that competition represents an improvement relative to the mo-
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nopolistic case. When public information is extreme, competition forces a rating agency to
behave less conservatively which improves the value created by assigning a rating to a project
and minimizes the possibility of a mistake. But when public information is not extreme, for
example for θ close to 12 , it is not clear which situation is better: if to be bold by issuing too
many good ratings or to be conservative by issuing too many bad ratings.
4.5 More Time Periods
If there was a time period 0, the rating agency would choose the rating to issue at this period
based on the expected fee at time period 1 and on the expected fee at time period 2 given the
optimal action at time period 1, both generally increasing with reputation. Then a correct
good rating at time period 0 would increase the future profit and an incorrect good rating
would make the rating agency’s future profit permanently equal to zero which means that as
before, the reputational cost of a mistake is capped at zero. When a project is expected to be
bad based on public information, it would still possible that an L rating agency would have
more to gain by issuing a good rating and managing to persuade investors and entrepreneurs
that they were likely to be dealing with an H rating agency than to lose if a mistake revealed
its true type. And when a project is expected to be good or very good based on public
information, issuing a bad rating at time period 0 would also mean that investors would
perceive the rating agency as being an L type and would replace it by its competitor. The
future profit would be equal to zero unless the competitor was either revealed or also perceived
as being of type L in the subsequent time periods. Hence, issuing a good rating even when
faced with a bad private signal at time period 0 could also still be at least as good as issuing
a bad rating, in particular for a rating agency whose quality of the private information is low
and/or the initial reputational level is low, as this is the agency that has the least to lose from
issuing a good rating.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the behavior of rating agencies, in particular it looks at their incentives to
issue a rating that is not justified by the private information collected about the project they
are rating in a framework in which they value reputation. The model finds that reputational
concerns are not enough to prevent deviations from the private signal, in fact these concerns
might end up being the driving force behind these deviations. A rating agency whose private
signal is perfect issues this private signal as a rating but a rating agency can make mistakes
may end up ignoring the private signal and issuing the rating that minimizes reputational
costs. Despite its simplicity, the model can motivate several patterns of behavior. In the
monopolistic setting, a rating agency is conservative in the sense that it issues too many bad
ratings ignoring private and even public information that indicates that the project is good.
Competition forces rating agencies to be more aggressive to make sure that they continue
being hired and are not replaced by the competitor. Hence, reputational concerns combined
with competition originate boldness as rating agencies issue too many good rating ignoring
private and even public information that indicates that the project is bad.
The model clearly illustrates how reputation and informational issues can distort ratings.
Competition might not solve the incentive problems faced by rating agencies unless it is
combined with better models of risk assessment, which would improve the quality of rating
agencies assessments, more transparency in that rating’s procedures, and measures to improve
monitoring and accountability in the ratings industry.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition proves the existence of a unique equilibrium in which a rating agency is
rewarded for correct ratings and punished otherwise. For this reason, α2 (rG, G) exceeds
α2 (rG, B), and hence reputation and fee are expected to increase when the rating agency is
correct and to decrease otherwise. Of course, this need not be the only equilibrium if one
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allows for different patterns of reward/punishment actions. However, this is the the only
reasonable equilibrium in the setup considered in the paper.
Define τ ∈ {HG,HB, LG, LB} as the set of possible types, where H and L indicate the
rating agency’s type, and G and B indicate the private signal, e.g. HG is an H rating agency
with a good private signal. The set of possible actions is binary: issue a good rating (rG)
or issue a bad rating (rB). The proof is divided in two main steps: first, it is shown that
in equilibrium the H rating agency must issue the private signal as a rating and second, the
equilibrium behavior of the L rating agency is derived.
6.1.1 Agency’s Posterior Beliefs about the Project’s Type
The rating agency forms the posterior belief about the project’s type using the prior about
the project’s type and (1) or (2) depending on its type. Hence:
Pr (G | sG,H) = 1, Pr (G | sB,H) = 0 (12)
and
Pr (G | sG, L) = εθ
εθ + (1− ε) (1− θ) , Pr (G | sB, L) =
(1− ε) θ
(1− ε) θ + ε (1− θ) . (13)
Note that
Pr (G | sG,H) > Pr (G | sG, L) > Pr (G | sB, L) > Pr (G | sB,H) . (14)
6.1.2 Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 1 An H rating agency always has less of an incentive to deviate from the private
signal than an L rating agency.
If an HG rating agency issues rB with positive probability then it is because:
F (α2 (rB))− c ≥ F (α2 (rG, G)) . (15)
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Given that F (α2 (rG, G)) exceeds F (α2 (rG, B)) and using condition (14), then an LG rating
agency has even more incentives to deviate from the private signal. By doing so it also receives
F (α2 (rB))−c and by non-deviating it expects to receive less than what the HG rating agency
receives, i.e.:
F (α2 (rB))−c ≥ F (α2 (rG, G)) > Pr (G | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, G))+Pr (B | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, B)) .
And when an HB rating agency issues rG with positive probability it is because:
F (α2 (rG, B))− c ≥ F (α2 (rB)) .
Following the same reasoning as before, an LB rating agency is also going to deviate from the
private signal because it expects to receive more than what the HB rating agency receives by
doing so, i.e.:
Pr (G | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, G))+Pr (B | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, B)) > F (α2 (rG, B))−c ≥ F (α2 (rB)) .
Consequently, an L rating agency deviates from the private signal whenever an H rating
agency does so.
Lemma 2 Whenever an LG (LB) rating agency deviates from the private signal with positive
probability, then an LB (LG) rating agency does not deviate from the private signal. Likewise
for an H rating agency.
If an LG rating agency deviates from the private signal with positive probability it is
because:
F (α2 (rB))− c ≥ Pr (G | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, B)) . (16)
But then using condition (14) it follows that:
F (α2 (rB)) > Pr (G | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, B))− c, (17)
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which means that an LB rating agency is necessarily going to issue the private signal as a
rating. On the other hand, if an LB rating agency issues rG with positive probability then
Pr (G | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, B))− c ≥ F (α2 (rB)) (18)
and consequently, using condition (14):
Pr (G | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sG, L)F (α2 (rG, B)) > F (α2 (rB))− c, (19)
which means that an LG rating agency issues the private signal as a rating. These results follow
as long as Pr (G | sG, a) > Pr (B | sG, a) and Pr (G | sB, a) < Pr (B | sB, a). In particular,
the same results follow for an H rating agency when applying the corresponding conditional
probabilities.
Note that this lemma does not exclude the possibility that both an LG and an LB rating
agency do not deviate from the private signal: expression (16) can hold with the reverse sign
while expression (17) is still valid. Likewise for expressions (18) and (19).
Lemma 3 There cannot be an equilibrium in which an H rating agency does not issue the
private signal as a rating.
This is proved by contradiction using lemmas 1 and 2. Assume that in equilibrium an HG
(HB) rating agency issues rB (rG) with positive probability. Then, an LG (LB) rating agency
always issues rB (rG) by lemma 1 as well as an HB (HG) and an LB (LG) rating agency by
lemma 2. But then an HG (HB) rating agency prefers to deviate and issue rG (rB) as by
doing so it reveals its type and maximizes reputation.
6.1.3 Investors’ and Entrepreneur’s Posterior Beliefs about the Rating Agency’s
Type
In order to show that an equilibrium exists, the way reputation evolves between the two time
periods needs to be examined. Consider the first case in which an LG rating agency deviates
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from the private signal with probability γ1. Then by lemmas 2 and 3: 1) an LB rating agency
issues rB, and 2) an H rating agency always issues its private signal as a rating. Hence, if rB
is issued a rating agency’s reputation at time period 2 is given by:
α2 (rB) = Pr (H |rB ) = α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
)
(20)
There are several situations that could give rise to this event: (H and B) with probability
α1 (1− θ), (L, sB and rB, and G or B) with probability (1− α1) (ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ), and (L,
sG and rB, and G or B) with probability (1− α1) ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1. And if the rating
agency issues rG, its reputation at time period 2 varies depending on whether the project pays
off 1 or 0. These two reputational levels are given by:
α2 (rG, G) = Pr (H |rG, G) = α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
) (21)
and
α2 (rG, B) = Pr (H |rG, B ) = 0
respectively. Moreover, α2 (rG, G) > α2 (rB) > α2 (rG, B) but α2 (rB) does not exceed α1
unless θ is low enough, and definitely for a range of θ < 12 . Obviously, investors need to be
very convinced that the project is bad to believe in a rating that is not verifiable. This is
going to be important for the competition case.
Consider the second case in which an LB rating agency deviates from the private signal
with probability γ1. Then by lemmas 2 and 3: 1) an LG rating agency issues rG, and 2) an H
rating agency always issues its private signal as a rating. When rB is issued, a rating agency’s
reputation at time period 2 is given by:
α2 (rB) = Pr (H |rB ) = α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1)
. (22)
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And if the rating agency issues rG its reputation is
α2 (rG, G) = Pr (H |rG, G) = α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
(23)
or
α2 (rG, B) = Pr (H |rG, B ) = 0,
depending on whether the project pays off 1 or 0 respectively. In this case α2 (rG, G) does not
necessarily exceed α2 (rB) and α2 (rB) exceeds α1 when θ < 12 and it is lower than α1 otherwise,
depending on the parameter values. Note that it is indeed the case that F (α2 (rG, G)) >
F (α2 (rG, B)) as α2 (rG, B) = 0.
6.1.4 The Equilibrium Behavior of an L rating agency
This section derives the equilibrium values for the probabilities γ1 and γ1 taking into account
lemmas 1-3. The cost of misreporting is taken to be arbitrarily small and is therefore ignored.
The effect of a non-arbitrarily small cost of misreporting is discussed in section 6.2.4.
(i) LB deviates from the private signal with probability γ1: Let an LB rating
agency issue rG with probability γ1 and rB otherwise. An LB rating agency decides to
misreport at time period 1 by looking at
Pr (G | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, G)) + Pr (B | sB, L)F (α2 (rG, B))− F (α2 (rB)) . (24)
The fee and the conditional probabilities are given by expressions (6) and (13) respectively.
The expression simplifies to:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) εα2 (rG, G)− α2 (rB)
]
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that using (22) and (23), implies the following:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε
α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
−
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1)
]
. (25)
This expression is strictly decreasing in γ1 and it is easily shown to be strictly increasing in θ
for the parameter values considered in the model and for 0 ≤ γ1 < 1 by looking at derivative
with respect to θ. The first term of this derivative is −1−ε2θ2 multiplied by the expression in
square brackets. This expression is equal to zero when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies
and it is negative if in equilibrium γ1 = 0. This makes this term equal to zero or positive for
0 ≤ γ1 < 1. The second term of the derivative is given by the following expression which is
always positive:
1− ε
2θ
[
(1− ε) ε
(θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε)2
α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
−
−α1 (1− ε) (1− α1) (1− γ1)
(α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1))2
]
.
For γ1 = 1 expression (25) is always negative meaning that the rating agency would be better
off deviating and reporting the private signal. And for γ1 = 0, the value of expression (25)
is negative only when θ is sufficiently low. It is otherwise positive meaning that the rating
agency would better off deviating and misreporting the private signal. Hence, when θ is low
enough, for example θ → ε, expression (25) simplifies to:
1− ε
4ε
α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
− α1
α1 + (1− α1) 2ε (1− γ1)
which is always negative and in equilibrium γ1 = 0. But there is a threshold θ > ε such
that for θ ∈ (θ, 1) there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies for any value of the
parameters. Because expression (25) is decreasing in γ1, it follows that in equilibrium in this
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interval 0 < γ1 < 1.
(ii) LG deviates from the private signal with probability γ1: This proof mirrors the
previous arguments. Let an LG rating agency issue rB with probability γ1 and rG otherwise.
An LG rating agency’s decision at time period 1 is taken by looking at:
Pr (G | sG, L)F
(
α2 (rG, G)
)
+ Pr (B | sG, L)F
(
α2 (rG, B)
)− F (α2 (rB)) . (26)
As before (6), (13), (20) and (21) are used to rewrite the expression which simplifies to,
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)α2 (rG, G)− α2 (rB)
]
or,
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
)−
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
)] . (27)
Expression (27) is strictly increasing in γ1 and it is strictly increasing in θ for any 0 < γ1 ≤ 1 as
shown by its derivative with respect to θ. The first term of this derivative is −1−ε2θ2 multiplied
by the expression in square brackets which is equal to zero when the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies and it is negative if in equilibrium γ1 = 1. The second term of the derivative is the
following expression which is always positive:
1− ε
2θ
[
(1− ε) ε
(θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε))2
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
)−
−α1 (1− α1)
(
(1− ε) θ + εθγ1
)− α1 (1− θ) (1− α1) (1− ε+ εγ1)(
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
))2
]
.
Then, observe that for θ sufficiently high, expression (27) is always positive regardless of the
value of γ1. This means that the rating agency is better off reporting the private signal for
high values of θ and in equilibrium γ1 = 0. Since the derivative of (27) is difficult to sign for
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γ1 = 0 it cannot be immediately concluded that in this case (27) decreases as θ decreases.
However, since the term in square brackets in (27) is always strictly increasing in θ and 1−ε2θ
is always positive for 0 < θ < 1, then it is the case that as θ decreases the whole expression
becomes negative exactly at the point at which the term in the square brackets becomes
negative. When this happens the rating agency would be better off deviating from the private
signal. And for γ1 = 1 expression (27) is negative (meaning that this is indeed an equilibrium)
or positive (meaning that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies because (27) is increasing in
γ1) depending on the initial reputational level α1. Take for example θ = 12 . In this case
expression (27) becomes:
(1− ε)
[
εα1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
) − α1
α1 + (1− α1)
(
1 + γ1
)] (28)
and it is straightforward to show that it is negative for γ1 = 0 but its sign depends on α1
for γ1 = 1. When α1 → 1 the expression is negative and γ1 = 1 in equilibrium.19 But when
α1 → 0, (28) becomes positive and 0 < γ1 < 1 in equilibrium. This results can be generalized
for any value of α1 because it can be shown that the derivative of (28) with respect to α1 is
negative for 0 < γ1 < 1. This derivative is equal to :
1− ε
2θ
{
ε
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
) − 1
α1 + (1− α1)
(
1 + γ1
)
+α1
[
−ε (1− ε (1− γ1))(
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
))2 − γ1(
α1 + (1− α1)
(
1 + γ1
))2
]}
and for 0 < γ1 < 1 expression (28) is equal to zero which means that the first two terms of the
derivative disappear.20 Hence, for θ ≥ θ > 12 an LG rating agency always issues the private
signal as a rating and for θ < θ there exists 0 < γ1 ≤ 1 such that the rating agency is either
indifferent between misreporting and not misreporting the private signal or always misreports
the private signal, depending on α1.
19Expression (27) is increasing in θ for γ1 = 1.
20This derivative is always negative for any value of θ as shown below in section 6.2.2.
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6.1.5 Establishing the Distinct θ Ranges
Take θ = θ defined above as the value of θ for which (25) holds with equality for γ1 = 0 and
θ = θ as the value of θ for which (27) holds with equality for γ1 = 0. The derivatives of these
expressions with respect to θ, and to γ1 and γ1 respectively, are presented above. It can be
easily demonstrated that ∂γ1∂θ > 0 and
∂γ1
∂θ < 0 by the implicit function theorem.
Moreover, as θ −→ 1, γ1 = 1, and as θ −→ 0, γ1 = 0. Thus, for θ ∈
(
θ, 1
)
then γ1 > 0 and
for θ ∈ (1− ε, θ) then γ1 > 0. It remains to be shown that θ < θ. Only then can be stated
that there is a region
[
θ, θ
]
for which there is no deviation from the private signal by the L
rating agency. Expression (27) evaluated at θ = θ (or γ1 = 0) is identical to expression (25)
when this is evaluated at θ = θ (or γ1 = 0), except for the probabilities Pr (G | sG, L) and
Pr (G | sB, L). Since Pr (G | sG, L) > Pr (G | sB, L), then expression (27) would exceed (25)
if θ = θ. Since both expressions are increasing in θ, equality in (25) and in (27) requires that
θ < θ.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
6.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Point 1. is shown in section 6.1.4.
6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The proof is done by implicit differentiation. By straightforward differentiation, and using
the fact that θ > θ > 12 , it can be easily shown that
∂γ1
∂ε is negative because expression (25)
is decreasing in ε and in γ1. Also note that (25) is equal to zero in an equilibrium in mixed
strategies which means that the first term of the derivative of (25) with respect to ε, which
is equal to the derivative of 1−ε2θ times (25), is also equal to zero. It is not so simple to show
what happens with ∂γ1∂ε . Expression (27) is increasing in γ1 and in ε for θ <
1
2 but can be
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decreasing in ε otherwise. The derivative of (27) with respect to ε is equal to:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε) +
θε (1− 2θ)
(θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε))2
− θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
(1− α1)
(
1− γ1
)
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
)]α2 (rG, G)
+
(1− α1)
(
1− γ1
)
(1− 2θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
)α2 (rB) .
For θ < 12 this expression is positive as the term inside the square brackets simplifies to:
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
{
α1(
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
))
ε
+
(1− 2θ)
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
}
.
However, for θ > 12 it is difficult to determine the signal of this expression. The expression
inside the curly brackets is always decreasing in θ. It is positive when θ → 12 (which makes
the derivative of (27) with respect to ε positive) and it is negative when θ → 1 (which makes
the derivative of (27) with respect to ε negative). Of course θ < ε < 1, but because it is not
possible to compute closed-form solutions to θ and γ1, it cannot be excluded that there is
small region of θ for which the overall derivative (27) is decreasing in ε. Thus, ∂γ1∂ε is negative
when θ is not too high and can be positive otherwise.
6.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Ignore 1−ε2θ . The derivative of (25) with respect to α1 is found to be negative. This can be
proved by straightforward derivation:
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε
[
α2 (rG, G)
α1
− α2 (rG, G) (1− (ε+ (1− ε) γ1))
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
]
− α2 (rB)
α1
+
α2 (rB) (1− θ − (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1))
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1)
,
summing and subtracting (1−ε)θ(1−ε)θ+(1−θ)εα2 (rG, G)
(
1−θ−((1−ε)θ+ε(1−θ))(1−γ1)
α1(1−θ)+(1−α1)((1−ε)θ+ε(1−θ))(1−γ1)
)
and mak-
ing use of the fact that in a mixed strategies equilibrium condition (25) is equal to zero and
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that α2 (rB) < α2 (rG, G), i.e. (ε+ (1− ε) γ1) (1− θ) < (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1) . As
(25) varies negatively with γ1, then ∂γ1dα1 is negative.
The derivative of (27) with respect to α1 is found to be negative. This is shown by
computing the derivative:
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
[
α2 (rG, G)
α1
− α2 (rG, G)
(
1− ε (1− γ1))
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
) ]− α2 (rB)
α1
+
α2 (rB)
(
1− θ − (ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1))
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
) ,
summing and subtracting θεθε+(1−θ)(1−ε)α2 (rG, G)
1−θ−(ε(1−θ)+(1−ε)θ+((1−ε)(1−θ)+εθ)γ1)
α1(1−θ)+(1−α1)(ε(1−θ)+(1−ε)θ+((1−ε)(1−θ)+εθ)γ1)
and making use of the fact that when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies (27) is equal to zero
and α2 (rB) < α2 (rG, G) , i.e. (1− θ) ε
(
1− γ1
)
< ε (1− θ)+(1− ε) θ+((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1.
As (27) varies positively with γ1, then
∂γ1
∂α1
is positive.
6.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
When the cost of misreporting c is not arbitrarily small expressions (25) and (27) become:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε
α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γ1)
− α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γ1)
]
− c
and
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γ1
)
− α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γ1
)]+ c
respectively. Deviating from the private signal becomes more costly for both an LB and
an LG rating agency, therefore the interval
[
θ, θ
]
for which there is no deviation from the
private signal by the L rating agency increases. Now when evaluated at γ1 = 0 and at
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γ1 = 0 respectively, expression (27) exceeds exceeds (25) by even more than in section 6.1.6.
Moreover, is it straightforward to show that both ∂γ1∂c and
∂γ1
∂c are negative.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The analysis here follows the same reasoning as in section 6.1. The competitive fees at time
period 2 are given by expression (11) whenever a rating agency is hired or are equal to zero
when an entrepreneur chooses to hire the rating agency’s competitor. Lemmas 1-3 still apply
as these lemmas do not depend on the form that the fee takes and rest on a single and very
general assumption that is still reasonable in this case.21 Consequently, the posterior beliefs
that define the reputational level of a rating agency at time period 2 are as defined in section
6.1.3. The cost of misreporting is taken to be arbitrarily small and is therefore ignored. Let
rating agency i be hired at time period 1.
(i) LB deviates from the private signal with probability γi1: Let an LB rating
agency issue riG with probability γi1 and riB otherwise. An LB rating agency decides to
misreport at time period 1 by looking at:
Pr (G | siB, L)F (α2 (riG, G))− F (α2 (riB)) .
A correct good rating from rating agency i implies that α2 (riG, G) > α1, which means that
the rating agency is hired after a correct good rating. However, it is shown in section 6.1.3
that the rating agency reputational level can actually decrease after a bad rating. In this case
the competitor is hired at time period 2 and F (α2 (riB)) = 0. For θ < 12 it is the case that
α2 (riB) > α1. Then, both F (α2 (riG, G)) and F (α2 (riB)) are given by expression (11) and
the probability by expression (13). The previous expression simplifies to:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε (α2 (riG, G)− α1)− (α2 (riB)− α1)
]
and substituting α2 (riG, G) and α2 (riB) by expressions (23) and (22) respectively, it is ob-
21This assumption is that reputation (and fee) is expected to increase when the rating agency is correct and
to decrease otherwise.
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tained that:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε
(
α1
α1 + (1− α1) (ε+ (1− ε) γi1)
− α1
)
−
(
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) (1− γi1)
− α1
)]
. (29)
Note that this expression is still strictly decreasing in γi1 and increasing in θ (because
α2 (riG, G) exceeds α1) for any 0 ≤ γi1 < 1. For γi1 = 1 the expression is negative and
the rating agency would be better off deviating and reporting the private signal. For γi1 = 0
the expression becomes:
1− ε
2θ
[
θ (1− ε)
θ (1− ε) + (1− θ) ε
(
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε − α1
)
−
(
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (θ (1− ε) + ε (1− θ)) − α1
)]
.
The expression tends to −∞ as θ → 0 and γi1 = 0 in equilibrium. But its value be-
comes positive when θ is sufficiently high. In particular, for θ = 12 it takes the value of
(1− ε)2
(
α1
α1+(1−α1)ε − α1
)
> 0. As expression (29) decreases with γi1, it follows that there
exists a threshold θc < 12 , such that in equilibrium 0 < γi1 < 1 for θ > θc.
For θ ≥ 12 , α2 (riB) may not exceed α1. This is not the case for γi1 = 1. The expression is
negative and the rating agency would be better off deviating and reporting the private signal.
But for γi1 = 0, α2 (riB) is lower than α1, which means that only a good rating generates
positive expected fees. Hence, 0 < γi1 < 1 and α2 (riB) > α1.
(ii) LG deviates from the private signal with probability γi1 : Let an LG rating
agency issue riB with probability γi1 and riG otherwise. An LG rating agency’s decision at
time period 1 is taken by looking at:
Pr (G | siG, L)F
(
α2 (riG, G)
)− F (α2 (riB)) .
For θ < 12 , α2 (riB) may exceed α1. In this case, (11), (13), (20) and (21) are used to rewrite
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the expression which simplifies to,
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
(
α2 (rG, G)− α1
)− (α2 (rB)− α1)]
or
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
(
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε
(
1− γi1
) − α1)
−
(
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1)
(
ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ + ((1− ε) (1− θ) + εθ) γi1
) − α1)] (30)
The expression is strictly increasing in γi1 and in θ for 0 < γi1 ≤ 1. For γi1 = 1, then
α2 (riB) < α1 and F (α (riB)) = 0 and the expression is always positive meaning that the
rating agency prefers to deviate. And for γi1 = 0, then α2 (riB) > α1 and F
(
α2 (riB)
)
> 0
and the expression simplifies to:
1− ε
2θ
[
θε
θε+ (1− θ) (1− ε)
(
α1
α1 + (1− α1) ε − α1
)
−
(
α1 (1− θ)
α1 (1− θ) + (1− α1) (ε (1− θ) + (1− ε) θ) − α1
)]
. (31)
This expression is positive when θ is sufficiently high and it follows that in equilibrium γi1 = 0,
but it is negative otherwise. This is because 1−ε2θ > 0 for any θ > 0, and the expression in
square brackets is increasing in θ. It is positive when θ = 12 as F
(
α2 (riB)
)
= 0 but when θ →
1−ε, it can be shown by straightforward manipulation that it becomes 14
(
α1
α1+(1−α1)ε − α1
)
−
1
2
(
α1ε
α1ε+(1−α1)(ε2+(1−ε)2) − α1
)
< 0. As (30) is increasing in γi1, it follows that there is a
1− ε < θc < 12 such that in equilibrium 0 < γi1 < 1 for θ < θc.
For θ > 12 , α2 (riB) never exceeds α1 and F
(
α2 (riB)
)
= 0. In this case, an LG rating
agency always reports the private signal and γi1 = 0. Then it is indeed the case that for an
LB rating agency in equilibrium 0 < γi1 < 1, as shown above.
(iii) Establishing the Distinct θ regions: It than be shown following the same rea-
soning as in the monopolistic case that 1− ε < θc < θc.
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(iv) Comparative Statics
It is clear that the sign of the derivatives of γi1 and γi1 with respect to θ, α1, ε and c are
not going to change relative to the monopolistic case. It is also the case that the intensity of
misreporting a good private signal is higher with competition, i.e. γi1 > γ1 for a given θ, and
the intensity of misreporting a bad private signal is lower, i.e. γi1 < γ1. This can be shown
by comparing (29) and (25) in the first case, and (30) and (27) in the second: there is extra
positive term that makes issuing a good rating more attractive in competition than in the
monopolistic case.
7 References
1. Benabou, Roland and Guy Laroque, 1992, ”Using Privileged Information To Manipulate
Markets: Insiders, Gurus And Credibility,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921-
958.
2. Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch (1992), ”A Theory of Fads, Cus-
tom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”, Journal of Political Economy,
100(5), 992-1026.
3. Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch (1992), ”Learning from the Be-
havior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(3), 151-170.
4. Bolton, Patrick, Xavier Freixas and Joel Shapiro, 2007, ”Conflicts of Interest, Informa-
tion Provision, and Competition in the Financial Services Industry”, Journal of Financial
Economics, 85, 297–330
5. Boot, Arnout W. A., Todd T. Milbourn and Anjan V. Thakor, 2005, ”Sunflower Man-
agement and Capital Budgeting,” Journal of Business, 78(2), 501-527.
6. Boot, Arnout W. A., Todd T. Milbourn and Anjolein Shmeits, 2006, ”Credit Ratings as
Coordination Mechanisms,” Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), 81-118.
45
7. Brandenburger, Adam and Ben Polak, 1996, ”When Managers Cover their Posteriors:
Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See”, Rand Journal of Economics, 27(3),
523-541.
8. Cantor, R. and F. Packer, 1995, ”The Credit Rating Industry”, Journal of Fixed Income,
Dec., 10-34.
9. Chemmanur, Thomas and P. Fulghieri, 1994, ”Investment Bank Reputation, Information
Production, and Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance.
10. Crawford, V. and J. Sobel, 1982, ”Strategic Information Transmission”, Econometrica,
50(6), 1431-1451.
11. Effinger, Matthias R. and Mattias K. Polborn, 2001, ”Herding and Anti-Herding: A
Model of Reputational Differentiation”, European Economic review, 45, 385-403.
12. Ferri, G., L.-G. Lui and J. E. Stiglitz, 1999, ”The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies:
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis”, Economic Notes, 28(3), 335-355.
13. Graham, John R., 1999, ”Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evi-
dence”, Journal of Finance, 56(1), 237-268.
14. Holmstrom, B., 1999, ”Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,”Review
of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169-82, originally in Essays in Economics and Management
in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics (1982).
15. Hong, Harrison, Jeffery D. Kubik and Amit Solomon, 2000, ”Security Analysts’ Career
Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts”, Rand Journal of Economics, 31(1), 121-
144.
16. Lizzeri, Alessandro, 1999, ”Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 30(2), 214-231.
17. Morgan, John and Phillip C. Stocken, 2003, ”An Analysis of Stock Recommendations”,
Rand Journal of Economics, 34(1), 183-203.
46
18. Morris, Stephen, 2001, ”Political Correctness,” Journal of Political Economy, 109, 231-
265.
19. Scharfstein, David S. and Jeremy C. Stein, 2000, ”Herd Behavior and Investment,”
American Economic Review, 90(3), 705-706.
20. Sobel, J., 1985, ”A Theory of Credibility”, Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 557-573.
21. Trueman, Brett, 1994, ”Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior”, Review of Financial
Studies, 7(1), 97-124.
22. Zwiebel, J., 1995, ”Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation”, Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 1-25.
47
